1. INTRODUCTION

• The International Court of Justice (known colloquially as the World Court or ICJ; French: Cour internationale de Justice) is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations. It is based in the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands.
o The successor to thePermanent Court of International Justice
o _________________________ are its 2 official languages

• The Court's workload is a wide range of judicial activity. Its main functions are to settle legal disputes submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies. The number of decisions made by the ICJ has been relatively small, but there has clearly been an increased willingness to use the Court since the 1980s, especially among developing countries, although the USA withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction in 1986, meaning it accepts the court's jurisdiction on only a case-to-case basis
• The ICJ is composed of _________________________________ by the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The election process is set out in Articles 4-12 of the ICJ statute. Judges serve for nine year terms and may be re-elected. Elections take place every three years, with one-third of judges retiring each time, in order to ensure continuity within the court.
• Should a judge die in office, the practice has generally been to elect a judge of the ____________________ to complete the term. Article 9 stating that all major forms of law must be represented has meant common law, civil law and socialist law (now post-communist law) are represented. Since the 1960s four of the five permanent members of the Security Council have always had a judge on the Court. The exception was China (the Republic of China until 1971, PRC from 1971 onwards), which did not have a judge on the Court from 1967-1985, because it did not put forward a candidate.
• Article 2 of the Statute provides that all judges should be "elected regardless of their nationality among persons of high moral character". A judge can be dismissed by only a unanimous vote of other members of the Court. Despite these provisions, the independence of ICJ judges has been questioned. For example, during the Nicaragua Case, the USA issued a communiqué. suggesting that it could not present sensitive material to the Court because of the presence of judges from Eastern bloc states.
• Judges may deliver joint judgments or give their own separate opinions. Decisions and Advisory Opinions are by majority and, in the event of an equal division, the President's vote becomes decisive.


2. CONTENSIOUS ISSUES

• In contentious cases, the ICJ produces a binding ruling between states that agree to submit to the ruling of the court. Only states may be parties in contentious cases. Individuals, corporations, parts of a federal state, NGOs, UN organs and self-determination groups are excluded from direct participation in cases, although the Court may receive information from public international organisations. This does not preclude non-state interests from being the subject of proceedings if one state brings the case against another.
o Jurisdiction is often a crucial question for the Court in contentious cases. The key principle is that the ICJ has jurisdiction only on the basis of consent. Article 36 outlines four bases on which the Court's jurisdiction may be founded.
• First, 36(1) provides that parties may refer cases to the Court (jurisdiction founded on "special agreement" or "compromis"). This method is based on _____________________________________________. It is, perhaps, the most effective basis for the Court's jurisdiction because the parties concerned have a desire for the dispute to be resolved by the Court.
• Second, 36(1) also gives the Court jurisdiction over "matters specifically provided for ... in treaties and conventions in force". Most modern treaties will contain a compromissory clause, providing for dispute resolution by the I.C.J.. Cases founded on compromissory clauses have not been as effective as cases founded on special agreement, since a state may have no interest in having the matter examined by the Court and may refuse to comply with a judgment. For example, during the Iran hostage crisis, Iran refused to participate in a case brought by USA based on a compromissory clause contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, nor did it comply with the judgment. Since the 1970s, the use of such clauses has declined. Many modern treaties set out their own dispute resolution regime, often based on forms of arbitration.
• Third, Article 36(2) allows states to make optional clause declarations accepting the Court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, many declarations contain reservations, such as exclusion from jurisdiction certain types of disputes ("ratione materia").Out of the Security Council members, only the United Kingdom has a declaration. In the Court's early years, most declarations were made by industrialised countries. Since the Nicaragua Case, declarations made by developing countries have increased, reflecting a growing confidence in the Court since the ________. Industrialised countries however have sometimes increased exclusions or removed their declarations in recent years. An example is the USA.

3. ICJ and SECURITY COUNCIL

• Article 94 establishes the duty of all UN members to comply with decisions of the Court involving them. If parties do not comply, the issue may be taken before the Security Council for enforcement action. There are obvious problems with such a method of enforcement. If the judgment is against one of the permanent five members of the Security Council or its allies, any resolution on enforcement will be vetoed. This occurred, for example, after the Nicaragua case, when Nicaragua brought the issue of the USA's non-compliance with the Court's decision before the Security Council. Furthermore, if the Security Council refuses to enforce a judgment against any other state, there is no method of forcing the state to comply.

o Case Study 1
 For example, in Nicaragua v. United States the United States of America had previously accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction upon its creation in ________ but withdrew its acceptance following the Court's judgment in 1984 that called on the United States to "cease and to refrain" from the "unlawful use of force" against the government of Nicaragua. The Court ruled (with only the American judge dissenting) that the United States was "in breach of its obligation under the Treaty of Friendship with Nicaragua not to use force against Nicaragua" and ordered the United States to pay war reparations.
 The Ruling
• On _____________________, the Court found that:
• The United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the Contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State.
• The United States of America, by certain attacks on Nicaraguan territory in 1983-1984, namely attacks on Puerto Sandino on September 13 and October 14 1983, an attack on Corinto on October 10 1983; an attack on Potosi Naval Base on January 4 and 5 1984, an attack on San Juan del Sur on March 7 1984; attacks on patrol boats at Puerto Sandino on March 28 and 30 1984; and an attack on San Juan del Norte on April 9, 1984; and further by those acts of intervention referred to [above], which involve the use of force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another State.
• The United States of America, by directing or authorizing over Rights of Nicaraguan territory, and by the acts imputable to the United States referred to [above], has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to violate the sovereignty of another State.
• By laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce.
• The United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to [above], and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on May 1, 1985, has acted in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on January 21, 1956
• The United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual entitled 'Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas' ("Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare"), and disseminating it to Contra forces, has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law; but [the Court] did not find a basis for concluding that any such acts that may have been committed were imputable to the United States of America as acts of the United States of America.
• The United States of America had to pay reparations for the damage.

 Implications
• The ruling did in many ways clarify issues surrounding prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-defence.
• _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
• Nicaragua's dealings with the armed opposition in El Salvador, although it might be considered a breach with the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition of use of force, did not constitute "an armed attack," which is the wording in article 51 justifying the right of self-defence.
• The Court considered also the United States claim to be acting in collective self-defence of El Salvador and found the conditions for this not reached as El Salvador never requested the assistance of the United States on the grounds of self-defence.

o Case Study 2
 The ________________________ (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland-Albania) arose from incidents that occurred on October 22nd 1946, in the Corfu Strait. Two British cruisers and two destroyers, coming from the south, entered the North Corfu Strait. The channel they were following, which was in Albanian waters, was regarded as safe: it had been swept in 1944 and check-swept in 1945. One of the destroyers, the Saumarez, when off Saranda, struck a mine and was gravely damaged. The other destroyer, the Volage, was sent to her assistance and, while towing her, struck another mine and was also seriously damaged. Forty-five British officers and sailors lost their lives, and forty-two others were wounded.
 The UK first seized the Security Council of the United Nations which, by a Resolution of April 9th, 1947, recommended the two Governments to submit the dispute to the Court. The United Kingdom accordingly submitted an Application which, after an objection to its admissibility had been raised by Albania, was the subject of a Judgment, dated March 25th, 1948, in which the Court declared that it possessed jurisdiction. The submission of 2 questions to find guilt:
 1._______________________________________________________________________________________________
 2. ___________________________________ by the acts of its Navy in Albanian waters, first on the day on which the explosions occurred and, secondly, on November 12th and 13th, 1946, when it undertook a sweep of the Strait?
 In its Judgment the Court declared on the first question, by 11 votes against 5, that Albania was responsible.
 In regard to the second question, it declared by 14 votes against 2 that the United Kingdom did not violate Albanian sovereignty on October 22nd; but it declared unanimously that it violated that sovereignty on November 12th/13th, and that this declaration, in itself, constituted appropriate satisfaction.
o DETAILS
o After the explosions on October 22nd, the United Kingdom Government sent a Note to Tirana announcing its intention to sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The reply was that this consent would not be given unless the operation in question took place outside Albanian territorial waters and that any sweep undertaken in those waters would be a violation of Albania's sovereignty.
o The United Kingdom also alleged the connivance of Albania: that the mine laying had been carried out by two Yugoslav warships by the request of Albania, or with her acquiescence. Such accusations remained unfounded as the Court felt proof was needed; there was none. So the origins of the mines remained a mystery. UK maintained that even if they did not lay the minds, they would have some knowledge of them.
o In the present case two series of facts, which corroborate one another, have to be considered.
o The first relates to the Albanian Government's attitude before and after the catastrophe. The laying of the mines took place in a period in which it had shown its intention to keep a jealous watch on its territorial waters and in which it was requiring prior authorization before they were entered, this vigilance sometimes going so far as to involve the use of force: all of which render the assertion of ignorance a priori improbable. Moreover, when the Albanian Government had become fully aware of the existence of a minefield, it protested strongly against the activity of the British Fleet, but not against the laying of the mines, though this act, if effected without her consent, would have been a very serious violation of her sovereignty; she did not notify shipping of the existence of the minefield, as would be required by international law; and she did not undertake any of the measures of judicial investigation which would seem to be incumbent on her in such a case. Such an attitude could only be explained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the mine laying, desired the circumstances in which it was effected to remain secret.
o The second series of facts relates to the possibility of observing the mine laying from the Albanian coast. Geographically, the channel is easily watched: it is dominated by heights offering excellent observation points, and it runs close to the coast (the nearest mine was 500 m. from the shore). The methodical and well-thought-out laying of the mines compelled the minelayers to remain from two to two-and-a-half hours in the waters between Cape Kiephali and the St. George's Monastery. In regard to that point, the naval experts appointed by the Court reported, after enquiry and investigation on the spot, that they considered it to be indisputable that, if a normal look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and St. George's Monastery, and if the lookouts were equipped with binoculars, under normal weather conditions for this area, the mine-laying operations must have been noticed by these coastguards. The existence of a look-out post at Denta Point was not established; but the Court, basing itself on the declarations of the Albanian Government that lock-out posts were stationed at other points, refers to the following conclusions in the experts' report: that in the case of mine laying 1) from the North towards the South, the minelayers would have been seen from Cape Kiephali; if from South towards the North, they would have been seen from Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery.
o From all the facts and observations mentioned above, the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of Albania. As regards the obligations resulting for her from this knowledge, they are not disputed. It was her duty to notify shipping and especially to warn the ships proceeding through the Strait on October 22nd of the danger to which they were exposed. In fact, nothing was attempted by Albania to prevent the disaster, and these grave omissions involve her international responsibility.
o The Special Agreement asks the Court to say whether, on this ground, there is "any duty" for Albania "to pay compensation" to the United Kingdom. This text gave rise to certain doubts: could the Court not only decide on the principle of compensation but also assess the amount? The Court answered in the affirmative and, by a special Order, it has fixed dine-limits to enable the Parties to submit their views to it on this subject.
o The Court then goes on to the second question in the Special Agreement: Did the United Kingdom violate Albanian sovereignty on October 22nd, 1946, or on November 12th/13th, 1946?
o The Albanian claim to make the passage of ships conditional on a prior authorization conflicts with the generally admitted principle that States, in time of peace, have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas, provided that the passage is innocent. The Corfu Strait belongs geographically to this category, even though it is only of secondary importance (in the sense that it is not a necessary route between two parts of the high seas) and irrespective of the volume of traffic passing through it.
o Albania has denied that the passage on October 22 was innocent. She alleges that it was a political mission and that the methods employed - the number of ships, their formation, armament, manoeuvres, etc. - showed an intention to intimidate. The Court examined the different Albanian contentions so far as they appeared relevant. Its conclusion is that the passage was innocent both in its principle, since it was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly denied, and in its methods of execution, which were not unreasonable in view of the firing from the Albanian battery on May 15th.
o As regards the operation on November 12th/13th, it was executed contrary to the clearly expressed wish of the Albanian Government; it did not have the consent of the international mine clearance organizations; it could not be justified as the exercise of the right of innocent passage. The United Kingdom has stated that its object was to secure the mines as quickly as possible for fear lest they should be taken away by the authors of the mine laying or by the Albanian authorities. The Court cannot accept these lines of defence. It can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force which cannot find a place in international law. As regards the notion of self-help, the Court is also unable to accept it: between independent States the respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation for international relations. Certainly, the Court recognises the Albanian Government's complete failure to carry out its duties after the explosions and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic Notes as extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom. But, to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.
4. CONCLUSION
o The UN therefore has had numerous issues in dealing with international law. Are there any others that you know off?