The United Nations: International Court of Justice

INTRODUCTION

• The term United ________________________________________ (UNCLOS, also called simply the Law of the Sea or LOS) refers to several United Nations events and one treaty. The events the term refers to are the (First) United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, the Second United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, and the Third United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. The treaty resulting from the Third United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea also bears the name United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea and is the most recent major development in international law governing the oceans. The treaty provided new universal legal controls for the management of marine natural resources and the control of pollution. Its Secretariat resides within the _______________________________________________________.

2. HISTORY

• 20th century many nations expressed a need to extend national claims, in order to include mineral resources, to protect fish stocks, and to have the means to enforce pollution controls. This was recognized by the League of Nations, and a conference was held in 1930 at the Hague, but did not result in any agreements. One nation that reflected the customary international law principle of a nation's right to protect its natural resources was the United States, when in 1945 President Truman extended his nation's control, to cover all the natural resources of their continental shelf. Other nations were quick to emulate the USA. Between 1946 and 1950, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Ecuador all extended their sovereign rights to a 200 nautical miles distance—so as to cover their Humboldt Current fishing grounds. Other nations extended their territorial seas to 12 nautical miles.
• By 1967 only 25 nations still used the old three nautical miles limit, 66 nations had set a 12 nautical miles territorial limit, and eight had set a 200 nautical miles limit. For the latest table of maritime claims, as compiled by the United Nations, see. According to that table, as of June 30, 2006, only a handful of countries use the old 3 miles limit (______________ __________________________). It also used in certain Australian islands, an area of Belize, some Japanese straits, certain areas of Papua New Guinea, and a few UK dependencies, such as Anguilla.


• UNCLOS I
o In 1956, the United Nations held its first Conference on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS I”) at Geneva, Switzerland. UNCLOS I resulted in four treaties concluded in 1958.
 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, entry into force:________________________
 Convention on the Continental Shelf, entry into force: 10 June 1964
 Convention on the High Seas, entry into force: 30 September 1962
 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, entry into force: 20 March 1966
o Although UNCLOS I was considered a success, it left open the important issue of breadth of territorial waters.

• UNCLOS II
o The United Nations followed this in 1960 with its second Conference on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS II”). UNCLOS II did not result in any international agreements. During the six-week conference at Geneva, UNCLOS II did not achieve much. Generally speaking, the developing countries participated only as clients, allies, or dependents of United States or the former Soviet Union; there was no voice for countries of the third world or the developing nations.

• UNCLOS III
o The issue of varying claims of territorial waters was raised in the UN in 1967 by Arvid Pardo, of Malta, and in 1973 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in New York to write a new treaty covering the oceans. The conference lasted until 1982 and over 160 nations participated. The convention came into force on November 16, 1994, one year after the sixtieth state, Guyana, signed it.
o The most significant issues covered were setting limits, navigation, archipelagic status and transit regimes, _____________________ (EEZ), continental shelf jurisdiction, deep seabed mining, the exploitation regime, protection of the marine environment, scientific research, and settlement of disputes.
o The convention set the limit of various areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline, as follows:

Internal waters
Covers all water and waterways on the landward side of the baseline. The coastal nation is free to set laws, regulate any use, and use any resource. Foreign vessels have no right of passage within internal waters.


Territorial waters
______________________ from the baseline, the coastal state is free to set laws, regulate any use, and use any resource. Vessels were given the right of "innocent passage" through any territorial waters, with strategic straits allowing the passage of military craft as "transit passage", in that naval vessels are allowed to maintain postures that would be illegal in territorial waters. "Innocent Passage" is defined by the convention as passing through waters in expeditious and continuous manner, which is not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or the security” of the coastal state. Fishing, polluting, weapons practice, spying are not “innocent.” Nations can also temporarily suspend innocent passage in specific areas of their territorial seas, if doing so is essential for the protection of its security.

Contiguous zone
Beyond the 12 nautical mile limit there was ___________ ___________________________from the territorial sea baselines limit, the contiguous zone", in which area a state could continue to enforce laws regarding activities such as smuggling or illegal immigration.

Exclusive economic zones (EEZ)
Extends ___________________ from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources. The EEZ were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although oil was also becoming important. The success of an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 1947 was soon repeated elsewhere in the world, by 1970 it was technically feasible to operate in waters 4000 metres deep. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and overflight, subject to the regulation of the coastal states. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables.

Archipelagic waters
The convention set the definition of Archipelagic States in Part IV, which also define how the state can draw its territorial borders. A baseline is drawn between the outermost points of the outermost islands, subject to these points being sufficiently close to one another.


Continental Shelf
Continental shelf is defined as natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater.

Landlocked states are given a right of access to and from the sea, ____________________________________.

3. PART XI

• Part XI of the Convention provides for a regime relating to minerals on the seabed outside any states territorial waters or EEZ. It establishes an International Seabed Authority (ISA) to authorize seabed exploration and mining and collect and distribute the seabed mining royalty.
• The United States strongly objected to the provisions of Part XI of the treaty, on several grounds. The US felt that the provisions of the treaty were not free market friendly and were designed to favor the economic systems of the Communist states. The US felt that the provisions could potentially result in the ISA receiving large revenues from seabed mining, and that there was insufficient controls over what these revenues could be used for. The US was particularly concerned that these revenues could be given to causes which the US opposed, such as the PLO. It was also concerned that the ISA would become a bloated and expensive bureaucracy even if seabed mining never proved to be economically feasible.
• Due to Part XI, the US refused to sign the UNCLOS, although they expressed their agreement with the remaining provisions of the treaty. They also expressed the view that even as not a party, it considered many of the remaining provisions as binding upon the United States as a statement of customary international law which it had accepted.
• It became clear that the US would not accept the treaty as it stood. It was felt that the treaty would not be successful with such strong opposition from the US. In addition, the fall of the Communism in the late 1980s had removed much of the support for some of the more contentious Part XI provisions. As a result, the United Nations resolved to negotiate an amendment to the treaty to meet the United States' concerns. As a result, the Agreement relating to Part XI was negotiated and agreed upon by the parties to the treaty and the United States. This modified Part XI to remove or soften most of the provisions the US was opposed to. In particular, it limited the size of the ISA bureaucracy and gave the US an effective veto over the dispersal of ISA funds.
4. CRITICISMS OF THE TREATY

The USA’s arguments fell into a few major categories:

• ___________________________________
• ___________________________________
• Navigation rights not threatened: One of the treaty's main selling points, legally recognized navigation rights on, over, and under straits, is unnecessary because these rights are not currently threatened by law or by any military capable of opposing the US.
• Redistribution of wealth: The treaty would force the US to pay taxes to the United Nations, further increasing the UN's power.
• Redistribution of technology: The treaty would force US businesses to turn over economically and militarily relevant technology to other countries.
• Undesirable precedent:
• Harm to de-militarizing operations:
• Internationalizing domestic law: Some of the treaty's conservation provisions would provide new avenues for non-U.S. environmental organizations to attempt to influence domestic U.S. environmental policies by pursuing legal action in both U.S. and international court.

Taken from: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm

5. LAWS AGAINST TERRORISM

• International conventions on terrorism set out obligations of states in respect to defining international counter terrorist offences, prosecuting individuals suspected of such offences, extraditing such persons upon request, and providing mutual legal assistance upon request.
• There are now a number of important United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on international terrorism, including UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and three important Security Council resolutions dealing with Libya's conduct in connection with the sabotage of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which includes UN Security Council Resolutions 731 (January 21, 1992); 748 (March 31, 1992) and 883 (November 11, 1993).
• ____________________________: These are international treaties agreed under the auspices of particular regional organisations, and generally the Conventions are only open to be ratified by members states of those regional organisations. However some of those organisations permit other countries to ratify the conventions concerned. The International Criminal Court and Terrorism.
• During the negotiations on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, many states supported adding a specific offence of "terrorism" to the list of crimes over which the court would have jurisdiction. This proposal was not adopted. However, the Statute provides for a review conference to be held seven years after the entry into force of the Statute. This review will consider (among other things) an extension of the court's jurisdiction to include terrorism.
• Despite the exclusion from the Court's jurisdiction of a specifically defined international crime of "terrorism" , certain acts carried out by "terrorists" may fall within the Court's jurisdiction because those acts fullfil the criteria of other offences which fall within the Court's purview. Thus acts of terrorism carried out by parties to an armed conflict constitute "war crimes" as prohibited by various articles in the Geneva Conventions, and will fall within the Court's jurisdiction where they constitute "grave" breaches of the Conventions. Furthermore some "terrorist" acts will constitute a "crime against humanity" which is an international crime which also falls within the ICC's jurisdiction. Article 7 of the ICC Statute defines a "Crime Against Humanity" as various acts, including murder, extermination, persecution of various groups, when "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”

6. "Terrorists" and Laws of War/International Humanitarian Law

• The obligations which the international and regional conventions impose, as described in sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 above, apply for the most part in situations where there is not an ongoing "armed conflict" [i.e"war"]. When there is "armed conflict", in the sense in which that term is understood under the laws of war/__________________________________(IHL), then the laws of War/IHL apply. Under those laws combatants ("belligerents") are subject to certain prohibitions. However an attack carried out on an enemy which results in death and/or injury is lawful, so long as it meets various tests of necessity and proportionalty.
• Whether or not persons/groups which might be characterised by some as "terrorist" are entitled to the privileges accorded to participants in an "armed conflict" depends upon whether in the circumstances they are "combatants", within the meaning of that term under the laws of War/IHL. The categorisation of any particular group as a "terrorist" or "combatant" is a matter which often divides opinion. A state/government which is in conflict with such a group is likely never to accord them the status of combatant, and in most cases the acts of such groups will in any event constitute criminal acts under the domestic law provisions in the jurisdiction concerned. However this is a different question to whether person/groups are entitled to the status of "combatants" under International Law. If they are so entitled their acts will not constitute crimes in international law, and as a matter of international law they are entitled to be treated in certain ways by their enemies [e.g. prisoner of war status if captured].
• However under the __________________________________, a person is eligible for prisoner of war status only if they "carry arms openly" and "respect the laws and customs of war". It also requires that members of militias and other irregular groups have "a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance." In so far as "terrorists" who are parties to an "armed conflict" fail to adhere to those rules, any claims which they may make to special status will be difficult to sustain. In such circumstances there is some debate as to whether they are to be categorised as (a)civilians who have committed crimes; or (b) a species of wrongdoer who, whilst not entitled to be treated as prisoner of war, may nonetheless be dealth with outside of the ordinary civilian processes for prosecuting crimes.
• Matters are further complicated by the 1979 Optional Additional Protocol 1 (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts) which applies in "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination"(Article 1:3) and furthermore the following clause appears to give guerrilla fighters in such conflicts lawful combatant and POW status, even if not wearing uniform, as long as they carry weapons openly during attacks:

o "In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a) During each military engagement, and (b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate."(Article 44:3)”

• Optional Additional Protocol 2 (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts) may also apply in many "insurgencies", "terrorist campaigns" or "civil wars". However this convention does not give non-government militants lawful combatant status or POW status, although Article 6(5) does recommend "broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict" after the end of hostilities. It also specifies minimum standards for those detained or interned ("persons whose liberty has been restricted"). The covention prohibits war crimes, "acts of terrorism" and extra-judicial execution and sets standards for fair trials--although it does not prohibit internment.



7. International conventions related to terrorism and counter-terrorism cases

• Terrorism has been on the international agenda since 1934, when the League of Nations, predecessor of the United Nations founded during the June 1945 San Francisco Conference, took the first major step towards discussing a draft convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorism. Although the Convention was eventually adopted in 1937, it never came into force. There are today thirteen international conventions in force, opened to ratification. They were developed under the auspices of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A 14th international convention is currently under negotiations. The UN General Assembly adopted on 8 September 2006 a "Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy".
• Conventions which are open to ratification by all states:
o The following list identifies the major terrorism conventions open to ratification by all states. A brief summary is provided in each case of the princicpal provisions in each instrument. In addition to the provisions summarized below, most of these conventions provide that parties must establish criminal jurisdiction over offenders (e.g., the state(s) where the offense takes place, or in some cases the state of nationality of the perpetrator or victim).
 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

1. __________________________________________________ ___________________________ (Tokyo Convention, agreed 9/63—safety of aviation):
a. applies to acts affecting in-flight safety;
b. authorizes aircraft commanders to impose reasonable measures, including restraint, on any person they have reason to believe has committed or is about to commit such an act, when necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft and for related reasons; requires contracting states to take custody of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander.

2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention, agreed 12/70—aircraft hijackings):
a. makes it an offense for any person on board an aircraft in flight [to] "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] seize or exercise control of that aircraft" or to attempt to do so
b. requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by "severe penalties;”
c. requires parties to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution;
d. requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under the convention.

3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention, agreed 9/71—applies to acts of aviation sabotage such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight):
a. makes it an offense for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; explosives etc;
b. make offenses punishable by "severe penalties;”
c. extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution;
d. requires parties to assist each other.

4. Convention on the __________________________________ __________________________________________ (agreed 12/73—protects senior government officials and diplomats):
a. defines internationally protected person as a Head of State, a Minister for Foreign Affairs, a representative or official of a state or of an international organization who is entitled to special protection from attack under international law.

5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials Convention, agreed 10/79—combats unlawful taking and use of nuclear material):
a. criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer, etc., of nuclear material, the theft of nuclear material, and threats to use nuclear material;
b. requires parties to extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution;
c. requires parties to assist each other.

6. International Convention (Hostages Convention, agreed 12/79):
a. provides that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offense of taking of hostages within the meaning of this Convention;”
b. requires parties to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution; and assist each other.

7. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (agreed 2/88—extends and supplements Montreal Convention):
a. extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention (see No. 3 above) to encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.

8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, (agreed 3/88—applies to terrorist activities on ships):
a. establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation
b. makes it an offense for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device or substance aboard a ship; and other acts against the safety of ships;
c. requires parties to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution; and assist each other;
d. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (agreed 3/88—applies to terrorist activities on fixed offshore platforms);
e. establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established against international aviation.

9. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification (agreed 3/91—provides for chemical marking to facilitate detection of plastic explosives, e.g., to combat aircraft sabotage). Consists of two parts: the Convention itself, and a Technical Annex which is an integral part of the Convention.
a. designed to control and limit the used of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives (negotiated in the aftermath of the Pan Am 103 bombing);
b. generally speaking, each party must, among other things: take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked plastic explosives; take necessary and effective measures to prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of its territory; take necessary measures to exercise strict and effective control over possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry-into-force of the convention.

10. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (agreed 12/97—expands the legal framework for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of persons who engage in terrorist bombings).
a. creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury;
b. requires parties to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution; and assist each other.

11. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing 1999
a. requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether direct or indirect, though groups claiming to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in such illicit activities as drug trafficking or gun running;
b. commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts;
c. provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other states on a case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy will no longer be justification for refusing to cooperate.

12. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005 [not yet in force feb 2006]

8. CONCLUSION
a. September 28, 2001 _____________________________________ ____________________________measure adopted September 28, 2001 following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and is therefore binding on all UN member states.
b. The resolution aimed to place barriers on the movement, organization and fund-raising activities of terrorist groups. UN member states were encouraged to share their intelligence on terrorist groups in order to assist in combating international terrorism. The resolution also calls on all states to adjust their national laws so that they can ratify all of the existing International conventions on terrorism.
c. The resolution established the Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee [CTC]to monitor state compliance with is provisions.
d. However, the resolution failed to define 'Terrorism', and the working group initially only added Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan on the sanctions list. This also entailed the danger that authoritarian regimes could label even non-violent activities as terrorist acts, hurting thus basic human rights.
e. The absence of any specific reference to human rights considerations was remedied in part by Resolution 1456 (2003)which declared that "States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”
f. UN Security Council Resolution 1566 picked up loose ends from 1373 by actually spelling out what the Security Council sees as terrorism:
i. "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”
g. Although this definition has operative effect for the purposes of Security Council action, it does not represent a definition of "terrorism" which binds all states in international law. That is a task which would could only be achieved by way of agreeing an international treaty under the auspices of the UN General Assembly. Negotiations towards agreeing such are ongoing, and a Comprehensive Convention exists in draft form, however agreement its exact terms, most particularly the definition of "terrorism", remains elusive.
h. Resolution 1566 also called for the creation of a working group that will expand the list of terrorist entities under sanction beyond the Taliban and Al-Qaida.

1. INTRODUCTION

• The International Court of Justice (known colloquially as the World Court or ICJ; French: Cour internationale de Justice) is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations. It is based in the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands.
o The successor to thePermanent Court of International Justice
o _________________________ are its 2 official languages

• The Court's workload is a wide range of judicial activity. Its main functions are to settle legal disputes submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies. The number of decisions made by the ICJ has been relatively small, but there has clearly been an increased willingness to use the Court since the 1980s, especially among developing countries, although the USA withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction in 1986, meaning it accepts the court's jurisdiction on only a case-to-case basis
• The ICJ is composed of _________________________________ by the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The election process is set out in Articles 4-12 of the ICJ statute. Judges serve for nine year terms and may be re-elected. Elections take place every three years, with one-third of judges retiring each time, in order to ensure continuity within the court.
• Should a judge die in office, the practice has generally been to elect a judge of the ____________________ to complete the term. Article 9 stating that all major forms of law must be represented has meant common law, civil law and socialist law (now post-communist law) are represented. Since the 1960s four of the five permanent members of the Security Council have always had a judge on the Court. The exception was China (the Republic of China until 1971, PRC from 1971 onwards), which did not have a judge on the Court from 1967-1985, because it did not put forward a candidate.
• Article 2 of the Statute provides that all judges should be "elected regardless of their nationality among persons of high moral character". A judge can be dismissed by only a unanimous vote of other members of the Court. Despite these provisions, the independence of ICJ judges has been questioned. For example, during the Nicaragua Case, the USA issued a communiqué. suggesting that it could not present sensitive material to the Court because of the presence of judges from Eastern bloc states.
• Judges may deliver joint judgments or give their own separate opinions. Decisions and Advisory Opinions are by majority and, in the event of an equal division, the President's vote becomes decisive.


2. CONTENSIOUS ISSUES

• In contentious cases, the ICJ produces a binding ruling between states that agree to submit to the ruling of the court. Only states may be parties in contentious cases. Individuals, corporations, parts of a federal state, NGOs, UN organs and self-determination groups are excluded from direct participation in cases, although the Court may receive information from public international organisations. This does not preclude non-state interests from being the subject of proceedings if one state brings the case against another.
o Jurisdiction is often a crucial question for the Court in contentious cases. The key principle is that the ICJ has jurisdiction only on the basis of consent. Article 36 outlines four bases on which the Court's jurisdiction may be founded.
• First, 36(1) provides that parties may refer cases to the Court (jurisdiction founded on "special agreement" or "compromis"). This method is based on _____________________________________________. It is, perhaps, the most effective basis for the Court's jurisdiction because the parties concerned have a desire for the dispute to be resolved by the Court.
• Second, 36(1) also gives the Court jurisdiction over "matters specifically provided for ... in treaties and conventions in force". Most modern treaties will contain a compromissory clause, providing for dispute resolution by the I.C.J.. Cases founded on compromissory clauses have not been as effective as cases founded on special agreement, since a state may have no interest in having the matter examined by the Court and may refuse to comply with a judgment. For example, during the Iran hostage crisis, Iran refused to participate in a case brought by USA based on a compromissory clause contained in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, nor did it comply with the judgment. Since the 1970s, the use of such clauses has declined. Many modern treaties set out their own dispute resolution regime, often based on forms of arbitration.
• Third, Article 36(2) allows states to make optional clause declarations accepting the Court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, many declarations contain reservations, such as exclusion from jurisdiction certain types of disputes ("ratione materia").Out of the Security Council members, only the United Kingdom has a declaration. In the Court's early years, most declarations were made by industrialised countries. Since the Nicaragua Case, declarations made by developing countries have increased, reflecting a growing confidence in the Court since the ________. Industrialised countries however have sometimes increased exclusions or removed their declarations in recent years. An example is the USA.

3. ICJ and SECURITY COUNCIL

• Article 94 establishes the duty of all UN members to comply with decisions of the Court involving them. If parties do not comply, the issue may be taken before the Security Council for enforcement action. There are obvious problems with such a method of enforcement. If the judgment is against one of the permanent five members of the Security Council or its allies, any resolution on enforcement will be vetoed. This occurred, for example, after the Nicaragua case, when Nicaragua brought the issue of the USA's non-compliance with the Court's decision before the Security Council. Furthermore, if the Security Council refuses to enforce a judgment against any other state, there is no method of forcing the state to comply.

o Case Study 1
 For example, in Nicaragua v. United States the United States of America had previously accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction upon its creation in ________ but withdrew its acceptance following the Court's judgment in 1984 that called on the United States to "cease and to refrain" from the "unlawful use of force" against the government of Nicaragua. The Court ruled (with only the American judge dissenting) that the United States was "in breach of its obligation under the Treaty of Friendship with Nicaragua not to use force against Nicaragua" and ordered the United States to pay war reparations.
 The Ruling
• On _____________________, the Court found that:
• The United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the Contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State.
• The United States of America, by certain attacks on Nicaraguan territory in 1983-1984, namely attacks on Puerto Sandino on September 13 and October 14 1983, an attack on Corinto on October 10 1983; an attack on Potosi Naval Base on January 4 and 5 1984, an attack on San Juan del Sur on March 7 1984; attacks on patrol boats at Puerto Sandino on March 28 and 30 1984; and an attack on San Juan del Norte on April 9, 1984; and further by those acts of intervention referred to [above], which involve the use of force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another State.
• The United States of America, by directing or authorizing over Rights of Nicaraguan territory, and by the acts imputable to the United States referred to [above], has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to violate the sovereignty of another State.
• By laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce.
• The United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory referred to [above], and by declaring a general embargo on trade with Nicaragua on May 1, 1985, has acted in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on January 21, 1956
• The United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual entitled 'Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas' ("Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare"), and disseminating it to Contra forces, has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law; but [the Court] did not find a basis for concluding that any such acts that may have been committed were imputable to the United States of America as acts of the United States of America.
• The United States of America had to pay reparations for the damage.

 Implications
• The ruling did in many ways clarify issues surrounding prohibition of the use of force and the right of self-defence.
• _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
• Nicaragua's dealings with the armed opposition in El Salvador, although it might be considered a breach with the principle of non-intervention and the prohibition of use of force, did not constitute "an armed attack," which is the wording in article 51 justifying the right of self-defence.
• The Court considered also the United States claim to be acting in collective self-defence of El Salvador and found the conditions for this not reached as El Salvador never requested the assistance of the United States on the grounds of self-defence.

o Case Study 2
 The ________________________ (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland-Albania) arose from incidents that occurred on October 22nd 1946, in the Corfu Strait. Two British cruisers and two destroyers, coming from the south, entered the North Corfu Strait. The channel they were following, which was in Albanian waters, was regarded as safe: it had been swept in 1944 and check-swept in 1945. One of the destroyers, the Saumarez, when off Saranda, struck a mine and was gravely damaged. The other destroyer, the Volage, was sent to her assistance and, while towing her, struck another mine and was also seriously damaged. Forty-five British officers and sailors lost their lives, and forty-two others were wounded.
 The UK first seized the Security Council of the United Nations which, by a Resolution of April 9th, 1947, recommended the two Governments to submit the dispute to the Court. The United Kingdom accordingly submitted an Application which, after an objection to its admissibility had been raised by Albania, was the subject of a Judgment, dated March 25th, 1948, in which the Court declared that it possessed jurisdiction. The submission of 2 questions to find guilt:
 1._______________________________________________________________________________________________
 2. ___________________________________ by the acts of its Navy in Albanian waters, first on the day on which the explosions occurred and, secondly, on November 12th and 13th, 1946, when it undertook a sweep of the Strait?
 In its Judgment the Court declared on the first question, by 11 votes against 5, that Albania was responsible.
 In regard to the second question, it declared by 14 votes against 2 that the United Kingdom did not violate Albanian sovereignty on October 22nd; but it declared unanimously that it violated that sovereignty on November 12th/13th, and that this declaration, in itself, constituted appropriate satisfaction.
o DETAILS
o After the explosions on October 22nd, the United Kingdom Government sent a Note to Tirana announcing its intention to sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The reply was that this consent would not be given unless the operation in question took place outside Albanian territorial waters and that any sweep undertaken in those waters would be a violation of Albania's sovereignty.
o The United Kingdom also alleged the connivance of Albania: that the mine laying had been carried out by two Yugoslav warships by the request of Albania, or with her acquiescence. Such accusations remained unfounded as the Court felt proof was needed; there was none. So the origins of the mines remained a mystery. UK maintained that even if they did not lay the minds, they would have some knowledge of them.
o In the present case two series of facts, which corroborate one another, have to be considered.
o The first relates to the Albanian Government's attitude before and after the catastrophe. The laying of the mines took place in a period in which it had shown its intention to keep a jealous watch on its territorial waters and in which it was requiring prior authorization before they were entered, this vigilance sometimes going so far as to involve the use of force: all of which render the assertion of ignorance a priori improbable. Moreover, when the Albanian Government had become fully aware of the existence of a minefield, it protested strongly against the activity of the British Fleet, but not against the laying of the mines, though this act, if effected without her consent, would have been a very serious violation of her sovereignty; she did not notify shipping of the existence of the minefield, as would be required by international law; and she did not undertake any of the measures of judicial investigation which would seem to be incumbent on her in such a case. Such an attitude could only be explained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the mine laying, desired the circumstances in which it was effected to remain secret.
o The second series of facts relates to the possibility of observing the mine laying from the Albanian coast. Geographically, the channel is easily watched: it is dominated by heights offering excellent observation points, and it runs close to the coast (the nearest mine was 500 m. from the shore). The methodical and well-thought-out laying of the mines compelled the minelayers to remain from two to two-and-a-half hours in the waters between Cape Kiephali and the St. George's Monastery. In regard to that point, the naval experts appointed by the Court reported, after enquiry and investigation on the spot, that they considered it to be indisputable that, if a normal look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and St. George's Monastery, and if the lookouts were equipped with binoculars, under normal weather conditions for this area, the mine-laying operations must have been noticed by these coastguards. The existence of a look-out post at Denta Point was not established; but the Court, basing itself on the declarations of the Albanian Government that lock-out posts were stationed at other points, refers to the following conclusions in the experts' report: that in the case of mine laying 1) from the North towards the South, the minelayers would have been seen from Cape Kiephali; if from South towards the North, they would have been seen from Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery.
o From all the facts and observations mentioned above, the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of Albania. As regards the obligations resulting for her from this knowledge, they are not disputed. It was her duty to notify shipping and especially to warn the ships proceeding through the Strait on October 22nd of the danger to which they were exposed. In fact, nothing was attempted by Albania to prevent the disaster, and these grave omissions involve her international responsibility.
o The Special Agreement asks the Court to say whether, on this ground, there is "any duty" for Albania "to pay compensation" to the United Kingdom. This text gave rise to certain doubts: could the Court not only decide on the principle of compensation but also assess the amount? The Court answered in the affirmative and, by a special Order, it has fixed dine-limits to enable the Parties to submit their views to it on this subject.
o The Court then goes on to the second question in the Special Agreement: Did the United Kingdom violate Albanian sovereignty on October 22nd, 1946, or on November 12th/13th, 1946?
o The Albanian claim to make the passage of ships conditional on a prior authorization conflicts with the generally admitted principle that States, in time of peace, have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas, provided that the passage is innocent. The Corfu Strait belongs geographically to this category, even though it is only of secondary importance (in the sense that it is not a necessary route between two parts of the high seas) and irrespective of the volume of traffic passing through it.
o Albania has denied that the passage on October 22 was innocent. She alleges that it was a political mission and that the methods employed - the number of ships, their formation, armament, manoeuvres, etc. - showed an intention to intimidate. The Court examined the different Albanian contentions so far as they appeared relevant. Its conclusion is that the passage was innocent both in its principle, since it was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly denied, and in its methods of execution, which were not unreasonable in view of the firing from the Albanian battery on May 15th.
o As regards the operation on November 12th/13th, it was executed contrary to the clearly expressed wish of the Albanian Government; it did not have the consent of the international mine clearance organizations; it could not be justified as the exercise of the right of innocent passage. The United Kingdom has stated that its object was to secure the mines as quickly as possible for fear lest they should be taken away by the authors of the mine laying or by the Albanian authorities. The Court cannot accept these lines of defence. It can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force which cannot find a place in international law. As regards the notion of self-help, the Court is also unable to accept it: between independent States the respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation for international relations. Certainly, the Court recognises the Albanian Government's complete failure to carry out its duties after the explosions and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic Notes as extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom. But, to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.
4. CONCLUSION
o The UN therefore has had numerous issues in dealing with international law. Are there any others that you know off?

1. UN roles in international security

• Peace diplomacy
o
.

• Peace making
o What it is: It is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to the dispute and resolves the issue that led to the conflict.

• Peace keeping
o What it is: They are efforts made by third parties to act as a buffer between warring parties / to separate antagonists (e.g. in civil wars, interstate wars) or to prevent hostilities between potential belligerents from escalating so that a negotiated settlement of the dispute can be reached.

• Peace building
o What it is: This refers to post conflict actions, predominantly economic and diplomatic in nature to strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions so as to avoid the return to armed conflict.

• Peace enforcement
o What it is: It is the application of military force or the threat of its use, usually pursuant / in accordance to international authorization, to force compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

• Collective Security
o What it is: It is a regional or global system that works on the basis that each state shares the responsibility for all other states’ security, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression.
o What it is not: It is not a system of balance-of-power whereby each state acts on its own self-interest for its individual protection (e.g. states forming coalitions to offset against others to equilibrate them so as to prevent war).


• Humanitarian intervention



2. The Charter and Peacekeeping

 Peacekeeping not mentioned in the Charter
The Charter never specifically mentions peacekeeping as a tool to be employed by the United Nations. The concept somewhat lies in the Charter in between Chapters VI and VII, in other words, it developed out of the Charter as an approach the support the main purpose of the UN (i.e. the maintenance of international peace and security).
 Chapter VI: Outlines specific means which countries may use to settle disputes peacefully before the conflict – negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional institutions or arrangements or other peaceful means.
 Chapter VII: Allows enforcement action by UN Members States after the conflict, including the use of armed force or other collective measures for dealing with ‘threats to peace’. For authorisation, endorsement is needed from 9 (including all 5 permanent members) out of the Security Council’s 15 members.

 Peacekeeping is ad-hoc
o Peacekeeping is essentially operating on largely an ad-hoc basis. Each operation has been tailor-made to meet the demands of a specific conflict. It was also to evolve and broaden over time.

3. Peacekeeping in the Cold War (Before 1985)

(A) The Concept of Peacekeeping
(i)The Policeman Role (The traditional/classical roles)

• Authority
o __________________________: Developed during the Cold War period, it was a means to resolve conflicts between states under UN command between the armed forces of the former warring parties.
• Roles/Purpose
o Observer role: Generally, they were deployed when ceasefire was in place and the parties to the conflict had given their consent. Their role was generally to observe and report impartially on the adherence to the ceasefire, troop withdrawal or other elements of the peace agreement. This was to provide space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict.
o Defensive role: Peacekeepers were not expected to fight fire with fire. They are only allowed to take up arms as a form of self-defence.

• Composition
o Unarmed or lightly armed military personnel
o Smaller in scale, fewer in numbers
o Given narrowly defined roles
o Deals with interstate conflicts
o Operates in familiar terrain

(ii) The Requisites of UN Success
• Role and the Mood of superpowers
Superpower rivalry, polarizing east-west dichotomy resulted in the frequent misuse of vetoes by US and especially USSR. (Note: The Soviets had used more than 280 vetoes from 1955-1985)
o This affected peacekeeping in the following ways:
 No unanimity in sending peacekeepers as the US and USSR are often engaged in a deadlock.
 Both perceived that sending peacekeeping forces to crisis areas would affect their own interest. (E.g. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US military actions in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli conflicts)

(B) Case Studies
(i) Limits of Collective Security and Emergence of peace-keeping operations
(1948-1956)

Limits of Collective Security – Peace Enforcement in Operation

a. The Korean War (1950 – 1953)
• Context : North Korea invaded the South in June 1950. The UN SC discussion took place in the absence of the Soviet delegates, who boycotted meetings since the beginning of 1950 over the issue of seating Taiwan in the UNSC. (this persisted until 1971)
• Organs involved :
o UNSC : Acted in Soviet’s absence. Being wholly western in composition, it recommended that UN members should assist the South. But ultimately, it was an American initiative legitimized by a UNSC resolution and not established under Article 43 of the UN Charter, which was to place military obligations on all the Charter signatories.
o UNGA : On Nov 1950, UNGA passed the ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution, which permitted the transfer of decisions over security matters to the GA when action by the SC was blocked by a veto.
o UNSG : Trygve Halvdan Lie’s pro-western sympathies are seen as quite evident in the Korean War.

• UN Force
o Was designed to impose and enforce a particular outcome.
o Was essentially action taken by coalitions where the UN allowed the US to lead and direct it. The UN force was essentially 2/3 American and the rest were Western states.
• The Limitations and Impact
o The Cold War Agenda promoted by the superpowers is somewhat incompatible to the idea of collective security since it was anticipated that the interest of one would like to infringe on the other.
After the Korean experience, the UN did not undertake ‘enforcement’ mission to defeat an aggressor for another 40 years until Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

b. India and Pakistan, 1947
• Context : In August 1947, India and Pakistan became independent. Under the scheme of partition provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir was free to accede to India or Pakistan. Its accession to India became a matter of dispute between the two countries and fighting broke out later that year.

• Organs involved :
o UNSC : In Jan 1948, the UNSC (with abstention from SU) adopted a resolution to establish the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the problem of the status of Jammu and Kashmir. It recommended various measures including the use of observers to stop the fighting. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was thus established in 1949.
o UNMOGIP :
 Was tasked to supervise the ceasefire in Kashmir. Its functions were to observe and report, investigate complaints of ceasefire violations and submit findings to each party and to the UNSG.
 It achieved reasonable success, but there is no political will by India and Pakistan to resolve the complex and communal problems in Jammu and Kashmir, so the UNMOGIP supervision of the cease-fire line remains to this day.

c. The Suez Crisis of 1956
• Context : Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 provoked Britain, France and Israel to launch an assault on the Canal Zone in Oct.

• Organs involved :
o UNSC : Was convened in Oct on American request and called for a withdrawal of Israel (indirectly referring to Britain and France, though at this point not engaged in military action). This resulted in the Britain’s first ever veto.
o UNGA : Uniting for Peace procedure was invoked with Soviet support to outflank this western veto and GA took up the issue. Passed a resolution to create the UNEF1.
UNSG : Dag Hammarskjold was instrumental in suggesting that the force should not include contingents from any of the permanent members of the UNSC. This was the first time what would become a fundamental principle of cold war peacekeeping. Dag was also to invent the concept of peacekeeping after the Suez Crisis when he in Oct 1958 circulated to the GA a ‘Summary Study’ to provide a framework of stand-by arrangements.

o UNEF1 – The Beginning of Peacekeeping Missions
 Was the First Major Peacekeeping Force set up by the UN.
 Task was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.
 Operated under the approved guidelines drafted by Dag.
 It oversaw the establishment of a cease-fire and the withdrawal of British and French forces by the end of 1956 and the withdrawal of Israeli forces by the end of March 1957.
 It was an armed peacekeeping mission, and comprised of peacekeeping forces without any permanent members of the UNSC.
 It was also the first time that the UN undertook military action with the consent of the parties to the conflict.
 It helped to maintain stability between the 2 countries, but when Egypt exercised its right to withdraw its consent to the force’s presence despite UNSG U Thant’s plea to not do so. It brought an end to the operation, resulting in the controversial outbreak of war in 1967.

(iii) ________________________________________________)

• Great optimism of peacekeeping work and the Cold War
o The success of the UNEF and the high expectations of the UN, furthered by the continuing work in Palestine and Kashmir, resulted in a surge of peacekeeping operations in the period 1956-1964.

• Laying the foundations of peacekeeping
o This period laid the foundations of UN peacekeeping operations. This included reaching an agreement on the number of guiding principles: The role of the UNSG and the UN command; the political perimeter of the operation e.g. the consent of host states, and at times the main parties involved, the need to maintain impartiality and neutrality and the need to be flexible
o It establishes the scope of peacekeeping; the outcome of settlement depends on the will of the parties involved.(i.e. peacekeeping cannot resolve underlying problems)

a. The Lebanon Crisis of 1958
Context : A crisis in the internal politics of Lebanon led to a sharp deterioration of inter-ethnic relations within the country wrought by religion and culture differences. Lebanon’s Maronite Christian president was worried by the threat of Muslim Arab hegemony in the Middle East. He enlisted the still western dominated UN to protect Lebanon from infiltration and the perceived threat of invasion from Syria.

• Organs involved :
o UNSC : A small-scale Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was deployed instead of a larger full-scale UN force to avoid the Soviet veto in 1958.
o UNOGIL :
 Was deployed as a UN military observer mission.
 Was to ensure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across Lebanese borders after the main regional body, the Arab League failed to resolve the increasing tensions between Christians and Muslims.
 The US sent it substantial force into Lebanon despite the presence of UNOGIL observers. This was because the US feared pan Arab militancy was becoming pro-Soviet (or at least anti-west) derived from Arab nationalism. This was seen by Nasser’s intentions to merge between Egypt and Syria and radical nationalist overthrew the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
 The Soviets veto 2 UNSC resolutions to renew the role of UNOGIL and UNGA passed a resolution suggesting that UNOGIL to replace US troops.
 US troops were withdrawn and in Dec 1958, after a deployment of 6 months, the UNOGIL was withdrawn.



b. India and Pakistan, 1965
• Context : Military incidents between India and Pakistan arose once again over Kashmir.

• Organs involved :
o UNSG : Adopted a resolution that called for a cease-fire and cooperation with UNMOGIP. It also passed another resolution to establish observers to monitor the cease-fire line outside Jammu and Kashmir and established the UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM).
o UNIPOM :
 Was primarily to observe and report breaches of ceasefire but they had no authority or power to order a cessation of firing.
 Played a useful role in calming the situation; was withdrawn in Feb 1966 following a peacemaking meeting between India and Pakistan under Soviet’s chairmanship.

c. Congo Crisis of 1962-1966
Context : In 1960, Belgium withdrew from the vast African colony and transferred power to an independent African government. The swift exit created a political crisis in Congo, resulting in a mutiny that brought about Belgian military intervention without the Congo government’s consent. Exploiting the chaos, the mineral-rich southern province of Katanga declared ‘independence’ from Congo. The Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba and its president, Joseph Kasavubu sought UN to help to deal with the unrest and threats of secession. The uniqueness of this crisis did not follow the standard peacekeeping guidelines established thus far by Dag :
o Host state consent had limited meaning since control of the state was uncertain.
o Defensive role of peacekeeping force in question since there is a need to re-impose order.
o The principle of non-interference in local politics would be unsustainable if UN acts on behalf of central government against regional secession.

• Organs involved :
o UNSG (Dag’s independence): The SG for the first time in UN history invoked the power given to him under Article 99 and Dag brought the issue before the UNSC himself. He initially sought the UNSC’s authorization for an operation that would cover the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo (aim seems similar to UNEF1).
o Dag had also personally identified with the operational details and his use of the initiative under Article 99 meant that whatever the real limits of his personal control over the politics of either the UN or Congo, he would be a prime target from the side, which perceived itself as the loser from the UN intervention.
o UNSC: The UNSC adopted a resolution that not only called for the withdrawal of Belgian forces but to assist the Congolese government as well. The force assembled in July 1960 was known as Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC).

o ONUC :
 Marked a milestone in UN peacekeeping operations in terms of responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation and the manpower involved. It included, at its peak, nearly 20,000 officers and men, and an important Civilian Operations component.
 Was to monitor the withdrawal of Belgian forces and help restore law and order.
 But when Lumumba was murdered in Feb 1961, the UNSC authorized the ONUC to use force if necessary to prevent civil war. This represented an abandonment of the basic Hammarskjoldian principle that peacekeepers should use force only in self-defence and shifting to more of an enforcement function.
 The UN troops launched operations to end Katanga’s secession and this in turn left UN open to attacks as well. The situation was compounded by an apparent accidental death of Dag in an air crash in Sep 1961 on his way to meet the secessionist leader of Katanga.
 Dag’s successor, U Thant did not bring a fundamental change to the UN operation in Congo.
 UNSC adopted a new resolution, which was even more forceful than the Feb resolution and ONUC was instructed to use force to end Katangese secession.
 Fighting broke out from late 1961 and by the end of 1962, UN forces were in control of Katanga. Congo was unified under a centralized administration and ONUC withdrew from Congo in Jun 1964.
The operation succeeded in fulfilling its mandate but it led to widespread distrust
 of the possible ramifications of peacekeeping (because of its peace-enforcement role) in the Third World.
 The Permanent Members of UNSC were also determined not to have a UNSG as dominant as Dag and attempted to establish the UNSC as the only UN body capable of setting up peacekeeping operations.
 Indeed, UN operations have been the most controversial of all peacekeeping operations and has been often cited as an example of the legal, humanitarian and political pitfalls of peacekeeping especially when it moves to a peace-enforcement role.


(IV) _________________________________________

• 1956 – 66 – Ended on a very controversial note
o Testing the limits of peacekeeping boundaries : Withdrawal of UNEFI from Egypt in 1967, followed immediately by the Arab-Israeli War. The Congo Crisis (1962-66) expanded beyond the narrowly defined role of peacekeeping to including assisting the incumbent government to quell a secessionist revolt.

• 1967 – 73 – More positive note with the coming of Détente
o Greater superpower cooperation : It was the period of détente around the late 1960s into the 1970s. There was growing awareness in the 1960s among the 2 superpowers that they could work towards mutual economic and technological benefit, and so they were more willing to cooperate to mutually resolve international conflicts than to unilaterally exploit them.
o New challenges with inclusion of new UN members : Membership of UN expanded throughout the 1960s and by late 1960s the built-in western majority in the GA had long vanished. There is a tendency for most part of the non-aligned towards anti-imperialism (vis-à-vis the west).

• 1974 – 84 – Less positive with détente in decline and the return to Cold War
o Less superpower cooperation: US and USSR were less able to see eye-to-eye on issues surrounding the countries in conflict.
o Less number of peacekeeping efforts: There was no new peacekeeping or observer force for 10 years after the formation of UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon). Even the UNIFIL was set up in the dying days of détente and had to operate in the midst of increasingly hostilities between US and USSR. This does not mean that the work of peacekeeping was suspended. Multilateral operations were still mounted but these new forces were for the most part substitutes for (or extensions of) existing operations previously undertaken by the UN.




a. Arab-Israel War of 1967 and 1973 (Peacekeeping operations in Israel and Egypt)
• Context: The withdrawal of UNEF1 from Egypt in May 1967 led immediately to the Arab-Israeli War. There was no UN involvement after the 6-Day War of 1967 to replace the UNEF until after the Yom Kippur war of 1973.
• Organs involved:
o UNSC: SU, US, Fr and Br supported the adoption of a resolution to set up the UN Emergency Force (UNEFII) was also to cooperate with the military observers of the UNTSO and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian efforts.
o 1971: Marked the entry of PRC to replace Taiwan as the representative of China in UNSC and it chose until 1981 not to participate in resolutions authorizing peacekeeping bodies.
o UNSG: Kurt Waldheim, who succeeded U Thant in 1971 played a secondary role.

• UNEFII (Oct 1973-Jul 1979) & UNTSO (May 1948 to present)

o UNEFII was to supervise the ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli lines in Sinai after the Oct 1973 war.
o It had a maximum strength of about 7,000 to supervise the ceasefire, and had no forces from Permanent Members of the UNSC.
o SU joined the US and Fr in sending observers to UNTSO.
o Poland became the first eastern European state to join a UN peacekeeping force.
o Thus given the mutual superpower interest in the force, its deployment and operation were effective and efficient. Both Egypt and Israel cooperated in the intervention.
o UNEFII created the conditions for negotiations for a comprehensive peace agreement but the UN made no significant input into the final agreement. It was almost wholly the Americans, through the encouragement of President Jimmy Carter that a treaty was agreed between Israel and Egypt at Camp David and signed in Mar 1979.
o The Camp David settlement was a victory for the West and the SU, being alienated from the US-driven peace process, made it clear that it would not allow the UNEF II to continue and the operation ceased in Jul 1979.

• The creation of a Multination Force and Observers (MFO) to replace
UNEFII.
o Context: The MFO is an international peacekeeping force that exists independent from UN coordination. Its origins were found in the events that follow the Israel-Eqypt Peace Treaty in Mar 1979 (see above) when the UN decided not to continue the peacekeeping mandate on the Sinai Peninsula (i.e. the disbanding of UNEFII). The terms of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty required the presence of international peacekeepers to ensure that both countries kept the provisions regarding military build-up along the border. In the absence of UN peacekeeping forces, the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace was signed in 1981 establishing the MFO.
o MFO
 Was essentially western in character consisting of US, Israel and Egyptian forces. It was more often than not seen as an American foreign policy project than an international one.
 Was to supervise the peace treaty that was established between Israel and Egypt. Being guaranteed by the US, the MFO faced no great operational challenge.




b. Crisis in Lebanon in the 1970s
• Context: Tensions along the Israel-Lebanon border increased especially after the relocation of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to Lebanon. Jordan had in 1970 expelled its Palestinian exiles, which sought refuge in Lebanon, particularly in the south. A civil war in Lebanon broke out in 1975 resulted in the Syrian intervention in 1976. The Palestinians took the opportunity to launch cross border attacks against Israel from southern Lebanon. In response, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in 1978 and occupied the South.
• Organs involved:
o UNSC: Adopted a US draft resolution to call for Israel’s withdrawal and the establishment of a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) except for SU which abstained from voting.

• UNIFIL (Mar 1978 – present)
o Was to oversee the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese government to regain its authority in the area.
o Had a force of 6,100 men by 1978.
o Was seen by SU as a western response to a problem of western international relations – those between the US and Israel. Superpower differences were also seen in the refusal of any Warsaw Pact states to contribute to UNIFIL
o Was not able to fulfill its mandate. Israel withdrew from the North but not the south.
o Hostilities flared up sporadically in 1980 and 1981. And in 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, despite the presence of UNIFIL, in order to destroy PLO’s (Palestine Liberation Organisation) presence there and to establish a regime favourable to its interests.
o Was not able to perform any peacekeeping function in an area dominated by Israel and its local allies from 1982-1985. This was because the SU was never enthusiastic to support UNIFIL and the US in the era ending détente was more reluctant to confront Israel’s objections to the UN role in Lebanon. Thus when Israel withdrew in 1985, it left behind an expanded security zone which further restricted UNIFIL’s authority.
o UNIFIL remained in existence till today.

• Multinational Force in Lebanon (MFN) to replace the ineffectiveness of UNIFIL
o Similar to the MFO. Operated outside the jurisdiction of UN.
o Was a western peacekeeping force created in Aug 1982 comprising of American French and Italian. It was re-designated as MNFII when the British troops were added in.
o Was to bolster the authority and demoralized Lebanese army and to act as a buffer force between Israelis and the local Muslim militias which remained after the departure of the Palestinians. (oversee withdrawal of PLO)
However, the MFN lacked the legitimization of a UN mandate and both sides did not accept the MFN role. The MFN was seen by the militias as instruments of pro-Israeli western and found itself coming into armed confrontation with them. The operation was wound up in 1983 having achieved less success than the MFO.


4. Peacekeeping in the Post Cold War period (1985-1991)

4.1 The concept of Peacekeeping
4.1.1 Expansion of UN peacekeeping (New roles)
• Authority
o More active intervention, more offensive role.
• Role/Purpose
o Expanded and diverse role: The role of Peace keeping widened after the Cold War period. Most peacekeeping operations more complex and larger, often to implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists.
o Multi-dimensional role: Peacekeeping operations are more multi-dimensional, requiring each to carry out a variety of functions involving peace-making and peace-building. It even involves more and more and more non-military elements to ensure sustainability. (E.g. monitor elections, oversee refugees, humanitarian aid.)
• Composition
o Larger in scale, more in numbers
o Lightly armed military personnel
o Given expanded roles
o Deal with inter and intrastate conflicts (i.e. domestic conflicts) e.g. civil wars
o Operate in unfamiliar terrain (e.g. very forested and dense areas)
o More expensive

4.1.2 Requisites for UN success

• ______________________________________
o Larger in scale, more in numbers
o The increase number of regional conflicts, not a result of the Cold War
o The enlarged role of peacekeeping to deal with the new sources of conflict (e.g. over national, ethnical, cultural, religious issues)
o Greater opportunities for the peacekeepers to get involved
o Increased successes of peacekeeping operations (e.g. roles played in Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador, Namibia and the height of its success was found in the role played in the Arab-Kuwaiti crisis in 1991)

• _____________________________________
o There was more agreement among the Big Five; there was a more convergence of interest between them.
o Less superpower interference in peacekeeping efforts (as there is less need to win over allies in the developing countries. E.g. in backing groups in civil wars and using them as proxies) means also less interest in their involvement in such conflicts (i.e. tendency to leave everything to the peacekeepers).

• New challenges
Peacekeeping became more expensive.
o More financial resources required and shortages remained.
o The defensive role of peacekeeping was put into question.
o The continued perception that the UN, including peacekeeping was a pawn of the West.
o Successes led to heightened expectations. (e.g. peacekeeping missions in the 1980s were relatively easy to manage but the outcome was less than desired)

4.2 Case studies
4.2.1 The resurgence of peacekeeping missions
• Increase in numbers of peacekeeping missions
o New operations and small scale: From 1984-1998, there were about 20 new peacekeeping and observer missions established as compared to the period 1945 to 1978 (when UNIFIL was established), there were only about 15 operations. 3 out the 15 operations had observer corps that had less than 100.
o Continuation of existing operations and larger scale: Out of the 15 operations, 5 of them continued on into the late 1980s and 1990s (UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF and UNIFIL)
• Operations covered a wider new areas of conflict
o The expansion of commitment to more parts of the world reflected the post cold war relations within the UNSC and also the types of conflicts that had gone beyond the earlier bipolar realities. There were 6 larger commitments in Europe (5 in various parts of former Yugoslavia and 1 in Georgia); and 2 in a new area of Middle East (the borders of Iraq); 8 in Africa, 3 in Central America and Caribbean, and 1 in Cambodia.
• Greater optimism of peacekeeping work
o There was general optimism that ________________________________ ______________________________________ now that the end of cold war had opened up areas previously untouchable by superpower rivalry. There was also greater likelihood that the superpowers were to cooperate in peacekeeping efforts given the new environment.

a. Afghanistan and Pakistan
• Context: Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in 1979 in response to a request by the Afghan government for assistance against insurgent movement. They soon became caught in a protracted conflict with the Afghan resistance factions, the mujahideen. It was only in 1988 that the SU announced it would withdraw its troops.

• UNGOMAP (May 1988 – Mar 1990) (UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan)
o Was to negotiate and report any violation of the Geneva Accord.
o Was to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the voluntary return of refugees and the non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other’s affairs.
o Was somewhat a facing-saving mission for the SU, which ended in March 1990.

b. Cambodia
• The Context: In Dec 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and installed a new government headed by Heng Samrin, a former division commander of the Democratic Kampuchea.
• The organs involved:
o UNGA: In 1979, the UNGA called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the non-interference by other states in the country’s internal affairs and the self-determination of the Cambodian people. It also requested the UNSG to exercise its good offices to contribute to a comprehensive political settlement.
o UNSG: After visiting the region, he saw possibilities and later detailed the main elements of a comprehensive political settlement. This included the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia; non return to the condemned policies of the recent past; promotion of national reconciliation; right for Cambodians to determine their own destiny; the respect of country’s territorial integrity’ and international guarantees to supervise the agreements reached. His proposals resulted in the first face-to-face talks among the 4 Cambodian parties in 1988, and a series of other conferences.
o UNSC: In Jan 1990, the 5 permanent members started a series of high level meetings on Cambodia, which resulted in the 4 Cambodian parties agreed to accept a comprehensive settlement including the mandate of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
o It further authorized a UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to be deployed once the final agreements have been signed.

• UNAMIC (Oct 1991 – Mar 1992)
o Mainly consisted of military liaison officers to help the parties address and resolve any violations or alleged violations of the ceasefire. It also looked into the issue of refugees repatriation routes, reception centers and resettlement areas and subsequently established mine-awareness and clearance programme.
o It was later absorbed into UNTAC.

• UNTAC (Feb 1992 – Sep 1993)
o Was set up after parties signed in Paris the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict in Oct 1991.
o Was the first vote to set up a peacekeeping body by Russia, following the end of SU and was the first UN force to include Japanese
o Was mandated to cover 7 components: human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, police, repatriation and rehabilitation.
o Was to consist of between 15,000 to 20,000 UN personnel including human rights, civil administrative, military components and police component
o Was therefore different from traditional peacekeeping missions because it amounted to an administrative authority exercising key functions of government (similar to UNSF in West New Guinea). It therefore assumed control of key sectors including foreign affairs, defence, security, finance and communications in order to build a stable environment for national elections. It also oversaw the successful repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced person
o Was successful in overseeing the elections in May 1993 and withdrew in 1993.

4.2.2 A return to the practice of peace enforcement?
a. Iraq and Kuwait
• The Context: Iraq was heavily indebted to several Arab countries after its war with Iran. It had hope to repay its debts by raising the oil price through OPEC production cuts but instead Kuwait increased productions and lowered price. Iraq also accused Kuwait of drilling into neighbouring Iraqi oil fields Iraqi had been unhappy that Kuwait had exceeded its OPEC production quota and was depressing the market price and Kuwait should help Iraqi call on other Arab states to cancel its war debt, having acted as a buffer against Iran. On 2 Aug 1990, Iraq therefore invaded and occupied Kuwait.

• The organs involved:
o UNSC:
 On the same day, it adopted Resolution 660 condemning the invasion and demand its immediate and unconditional withdrawal its forces. It also adopted Resolution 661 on 6 Aug to impose a wide range of mandatory arms and economic sanctions (excluding humanitarian supplies) against Iraq.
 Saddam responded by annexing Kuwait as its 19th province; the first time in UN history that a member state forcibly annexed another)
 On 18 Aug, SC unanimously adopted Resolution 664 demanding an end to Saddam’s forcible closure of diplomatic mission in Kuwait and the seizure of large number of Western hostages.
 Subsequent resolutions were adopted. Resolution 665 imposed a maritime blockade of Iraq; Resolution 670 imposed air sanctions; Resolution 666 authorised the dispatch of humanitarian aid to Iraq and Kuwait; Resolution 667 reverted to Iraqi aggressive acts against diplomatic personnel and premises in Kuwait and the abduction of foreign nationals; Resolution 674 called for Iraq to stop its mistreatment of Kuwaitis and to collate its human right breaches
 With all non-military means being exhausted, it was clear that the UNSC was advancing on a watershed, namely the formal authorization of the use of force. It there culminated to Resolution 678 that if Iraq refuse to implement UNSC’s resolutions, member states would cooperate with Kuwait government to use all necessary means to force Iraq to do so (as sanctioned under Chapter VII, article 42). In Jan 1991, the coalition armed forces launched a systematic and comprehensive attack on Iraq and liberated Kuwait in Feb 1991.
 Adopted Resolution 687 on Apr 1991 to detail conditions for a formal ceasefire to end the conflict and establish a demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait to be monitored by a UN observer unit. The Resolution also covered all bilateral Kuwait/Iraq issues and foreshow action on the question of chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, regional arms control, hostage taking, terrorism and humanitarian matters. Furthermore, the Resolution 689 was adopted to establish the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).
 These, among other things, were the most intrusive and wide ranging arrays of demands made on a sovereign state since the creation of UN in Oct 1945.
• UNIKOM (Apr 1991 – Oct 2003)
o Was given the mandate to monitor the DMZ, to deter violations of the boundary and to observe any hostile action mounted from the territory of one state against another. It however did not have the authority or capacity to take action to prevent the entry of military personnel or equipment into the DMZ and the military observers were unarmed
o Include military forces drawn from UNFICYP and UNIFIL, which were withdrawn by the end of June 1991.
o Its mandate was expanded in 1993 following a series of incidents on the DMZ involving Iraqi intrusions to include the capacity to take physical action to prevent or redress small scale violations of the DMZ and the problems arising from Iraqi installations, citizens and assets in the DMZ.
o The mission ended in Oct 2003

b. Somalia
• The Context: In 1991, President Siad Bare was overthrown, leading to conflict between warlords leading to civil war. More than a million people were in danger of starvation
• The organs involved:
o UNSC:
 January 1992, passed a resolution imposing an arms embargo against Somalia.
 Would later sanction actions that allowed USA to
• UNOSOM (1992 – 1993)
o Organised along traditional lines, believing that it was working with the permission of the government, but in reality there was no true central Somalian government, all claiming authority. So there was simply “no host state”
o Pakistan troops formed the bulk of the forces but were attacked by warring factions, and since other states were unwilling to contribute forces, Somalians continued to suffer.
o Operation Restore Hope
- US forces created a task force (US not UN)
- Therefore with the SC’s blessing The United Task Force (UNITAF) was created, headed by USA with 29 other nations
• UNOSOM II
o Once UNITAF had achieved a level of stability, the UN forces created a new force, UNOSOM II. Was this due to the USA forces succeeding where the UN forces had failed at first?
o Never quite reached the target of 28,000 personnel it needed – possibly due to lack of support for efforts in Somalia
o UNITAF wanted to leave but soon it was realized that many states preferred US presence
o The problem was that the USA forces also wanted to move beyond UN directives and remove the warlords, which led to increasing death toll; in particular in a conflict in Mogadishu.
- 23 Pakistani troops were killed in an ambush led by General Aidid
- He and his supporters denounced UN and US involvement in what they believed was a domestic affair.
o Showed that peace could not be maintained unless the locals were disarmed, which they had been trying to do since 1991.
o UN forces were also unable to target enemy forces correctly, leading to deaths of many civilians and their welcome also soon began to wear thin. (Sep 1993, UN helicopter fired into a crowd, killing 200; including women and children)
o UN forces were neither well trained or familiar with the region.
o No clear directive – were they there for peacekeeping or were they there as a coercive force? What were the roles of the UN and US troops?
o UNOSOM left in March 1995, where the warlords battled for the UN compound.

c. Rwanda
• The Context: The genocide in Rwanda was the mass killing of hundreds of thousands of Rwanda's Tutsis (and moderated Hutus) by the Hutu dominated government over the course of approximately 100 days. With the death toll ranging from between 500,000 and 1,000,000.

• The organs involved:
o UNSC
• UNAMIR (1993 - 1996)
o Failure in Somalia affected actions in Rwanda.
o After the killing of 10 peacekeepers in 1994, Belgium wanted to pull its forces, believing that there was no peace to keep and its members were in danger for no reason.
o Other states followed suit because of “unacceptable” risk.
o UNSC reduced presence in the region
o They were therefore unable to prevent the genocide from taking place.
o For approximately 100 days, or more, from the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana on April 6 through mid-July, at least 500,000 people were killed
o The situation proved too "risky" for the United Nations to attempt to help. The UN-mandated French-led force, under Operation Turquoise, established and maintained a "safe zone" for Hutu refugees to flee to in the southwest. Eventually, after the UN Mandate of the French mission was at an end, millions of refugees left Rwanda, mainly headed to Zaire (Now the Democratic Republic of Congo).
o The UN's mandate forbids intervening in the internal politics of any country unless the crime of genocide is being committed. France has been accused of aiding the Hutu regime to flee. Despite emphatic demands from UNAMIR's commanders in Rwanda before and throughout the genocide, its requests for authorization to end it were refused and its intervention-capacity was even reduced.

5. Common characteristics
• Features: While each UN peacekeeping operation is unique, there are some common features
o All are required the consent of parties involved in a dispute
o None can be unilaterally imposed or from outside; they have to be invited by host country
o None are involved military enforcement measures or coercive actions, except in the very limited context of self-defence or defence of civilian populations
o All involved in the deployment in the field (military/civilian) are made available to the Secretary-General by governments
o All are under the operational command of the Secretary General of the UN
• All are deployed to help control and resolve international conflicts, or increasingly, internal conflicts having an international dimension.

Problems:

On the part of UN peacekeeping forces
o ____________________: Peacekeepers being drawn from various countries commonly faced the difficulty of cooperating together resulting in problems of coordination, communication and commitment.
o _____________________: Peacekeepers are also faced with the difficulty of carrying out their missions if there were insufficient resources in terms of arms, numbers or even training. This is especially so whenever developing countries contribute peacekeeping troops
o ___________________________: Although Article 43 provided for a permanent standing force, it was never set up. Very often, the UNSG has to persuade countries to contribute troops for peacekeeping missions. This often delays the set up, and by the time it is assembled, the conflict situation might have taken a turn for the worse.
o ____________________: According to Article 2(4), peacekeeping forces are supposed not to take sides in the conflict, but this was not always the case especially during the Cold War.

On the part of UN organization
o Financial constraints of member states: Upkeep of peacekeeping forces is expensive. From 1948 to 2005, cost of supporting peacekeeping operations is about US$36 billion. Article 17 states that the expenses by UN should be borne by member states and this include peacekeeping expenses apart from the regular ones. However, the peacekeeping forces suffer from financial resources because of:
 Accumulation of unpaid contributions: E.g. by 1986, only 19/150 countries paid their contributions in full that includes those from
 Developing countries: They make up ¾ of GA members and the country’s huge demands often affects their payment abilities.
 Developed countries: Rich countries at times withhold or delay payment for various reasons.
 An example: The US delayed payments because many developing countries were anti-US for they felt that the US was not doing enough to help the poorer countries. Moreover the US economy was not doing well e.g. in 1980s, US suffered twin deficit – budget and trade i.e. spend more than it received, especially deriving from the trade imbalance with Japan. US was also unhappy with the UN and wanted weighted vote instead of single vote.
 Lack of enforcement on members in arrears: Article 19, which spelt out penalty for late payment via deprivation of voting rights were not strictly implemented.
 Bureaucracy and mismanagement: The increased size of the organization created red tape resulting in duplication of duties, having staff in excess and hiring of costly consultants. There was also instances of corruption and embezzlement, all of which serves to drain monies away from peacekeeping efforts
o Constrained roles of UN organs: In particular, the Secretary General which according to Article 99 could only bring to the attention of the UNSC potential threats to peace and secretary, and the UNSC decisions are very much influenced by their own national interests

On the part of host countries
o Intervention and termination is dependent on host country: Article 2(7) is designed to protect sovereignty of countries but host’s decision vis-à-vis peacekeeping efforts could hinder peace efforts e.g. UNEF1 was stationed after the Suez crisis, but U Thant’s acceded to Nasser’s call for withdrawal in 1967, the result was the 6 Day War.
o Lack of political will by warring countries to solve conflicts: Such conflicts often involved parties/groups of competing interests and they may be less keen to seek international solutions to end conflicts as it could be jeopardizing their own vest positions of power and authority.

5. UN’s role in promoting peace

5.1 How does UN promote peace?
• Provide alternative to war solution: As a center for diplomacy and debate, it provides an alternative to war, a framework for the peaceful settlement of disputes. In times of
international crisis, the UN works to ease tensions and facilitates negotiations. It is a rally point for those who try to prevent or stop armed conflicts.
• Use of wide range of peace instruments: The UN promotes peace through a wide range of its activities: UN promotes peace through its efforts to protect human rights, through its peacekeeping operations and through work in developing a growing body of international law. It undertakes preventive diplomacy to stop conflicts before they get started. It provides electoral assistance and support democratization process. In promoting economic and social developments, the UN helps to sustain peace by working to eliminate deep-seated causes of war. Alongside the rest of the UN family of organizations, the UN provides humanitarian assistance, repatriates refugees and helps repair national infrastructure and promotes reconstruction.

5.2 Why can’t UN impose peace?
• Unable to impose peace by force: It is not a world government. It has no standing army and no military assets. It is not an international police force. The effectiveness of the UN depends on the Member States, which decides if, when and how the UN takes action to end conflict.
• UN organs use peaceful means to maintaining peace and security:
o The UNSC: Has this special responsibility for maintaining peace and security. It can exert diplomatic and political pressure on the parties to a conflict or provide means for settling dispute e.g. using fact-finding or mediation missions.
o The GA: Can bring the power of world opinion to bear on the warring parties
o The SG: Can lead in negotiations and bring an end to fighting
o The peacekeeping forces: Once a truce is in place, the UNSC may deploy a peacekeeping operation to help parties carry out their agreements
• UN organs use stronger means to enforce peace and security:
• The UNSC: If persuasion fails, the UNSC can take stronger actions e.g. imposing economic sanctions, declaring a trade embargo or use armed force. It may also establish international tribunals to try persons accused of war crimes as it had done in the case of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. On some occasions, the UNSC has authorized member states to use ‘all necessary means’ including armed force to deal with armed conflict e.g. Kuwait in 1991.

5.3 Who establishes peacekeeping operations? The role of UNSC
• Establishes peacekeeping operations, where decisions are subject to veto by the 5 permanent members.
• Determines the mandate, size, scope and duration of an operation based on recommendations, including financial information provided by the UNSG. The UNGA votes on the operations budget.
• Determines peacekeepers’ duties according to the requirement of each situation. Peacekeepers may observe ceasefire, establish a buffer zone, help former opponents carry out a peace agreement, protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, assist with the demobilization of former fighters and their return to normal life, set up mine clearance programmes, supervise or conduct elections, train civilian police and monitor respect for human rights.
• Permits troops who serve in a UN operation to carry light arms for use only according to strict rules of self defence or when an armed party attempts to prevent them from
Carrying out their mandate. However force is rarely used as it often involves difficult choices and is controversial.

5.4 Who commands the UN peacekeeping operations
• UNSC is in charge of the peacekeeping functions of the operation. The UNSG, with the agreement of the UNSC appoints a Head of Mission and a Force Commander or Chief Military Observer. The Head of Mission/Force Commander/Chief Military Observer reports to the UNSG, who in turn reports to the UNSC.
• Government volunteers military and civilian police personnel to peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis. Each government retains ultimate control over its own personnel. A national contingent serves under its own commanding officer. All uniformed personnel wear their national uniform. They are identified as UN peacekeepers by a UN blue helmet or beret and a UN badge.

5.5 What is UN doing to make peacekeeping more efficient?
• Provide more resources for peacekeeping efforts: By late 1998, 80 member states had officially expressed their willingness to enter into standby arrangements with the UN. 61 of these had specified the resources they could make available if they decided to participate in an operation and 20 had singed standby agreements. Within this framework, a group of member states has established a Standby Force High Readiness Brigade to enhance the capacity of their troops to serve together in a peacekeeping context.
• Better communication infrastructure: At the UN Headquarters in New York, the Situation Centre provides 24 hour link with all peacekeeping operations. In Brindisi in Italy, the UN’s supply and storage depot improves storage and maintenance of reusable assets, saves money in procurement costs and facilitates faster deployment of new operations.